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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the role of the Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand's constitution. It is currently 
unclear the exact role the Treaty plays in New Zealand's constitution. This paper outlines a suggestion for 
formalising that role. 
4 
The paper looks at the New Zealand system, the way the New Zealand system has evolved and also 
compares the New Zealand system with the system from the United States of America. The paper then goes 
on to look at contemporary arguments for and against clarifying the position of the Treaty in New 
Zealand 's constitution. 
The paper then addresses how the Treaty should be afforded greater protection by its inclusion in a form of 
higher law or constitutional document as part of a Hybrid constitution. Through the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 New Zealand has already developed a Hybrid constitution, but I will set out that this 
should evolve so that there is more dialogue between the legislature and the courts. Two constitutional 
systems that have the potential for this type of dialogue are the systems in Canada and the United Kingdom. 
The paper then identifies some practical difficulties that might be faced if New Zealand were to look at 
enacting the Treaty. 
Finally the paper concludes that clarifying the position of the Treaty in New Zealand's constitution will not 
only provide greater order but will improve community access to, understanding of, and confidence in, the 
constitution. It is acknowledged that adopting the Treaty in a Constitution as part of a new hybrid model is 
going to require New Zealand to address difficult issues. But this paper suggests that this should not be a 
reason for New Zealand to defer dealing with these issues. 
WORD COUNT 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes, bibliography and 
bibliography) comprises approximately 12,364 words. 
I INTRODUCTION 
The Treaty of Waitangi ("Treaty") is increasingly seen as a founding document in New 
Zealand's constitutional arrangements.' While not every one would agree with this 
assessment, it is clear that the Treaty does play an influential role in New Zealand's 
constitutional arrangements. In particular it has helped shape dialogue between the 
Crown and the Maori people. Despite its influence the nature and extent of its role has 
not been clearly defined. 2 
The rights of the Maori people that flow from the Treaty are broadly speaking analogous 
to other minority rights. In the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 ("NZBORA") New 
Zealand has set out some of the rights that it has held to be fundamental to its society. 
Treaty rights are not protected under the NZBORA but are dealt with on a more ad hoe 
basis. 
5 
Some of the analysis below is also applicable to the rights of minorities generally. 
However, it is important to remember that the relationship between the Crown and Maori 
has an extra layer of complexity because the Maori people were in New Zealand prior to 
Europeans and because of the Treaty. These two factors mean that the Maori people have 
a different status in New Zealand society to other minorities. 
In this paper I propose that Treaty rights should be afforded protection through inclusion 
in a form of higher law or constitutional document. For the purposes of this paper I will 
refer to this form of higher law as a Constitution. It is submitted that any such 
Constitution would also likely include the other minority rights protected under the 
NZBORA, but it is beyond the scope of this paper to specifically consider other minority 
1 See generally Royal Commission on the Electoral System Towards a better del/locracy (1986) 109 where 
it noted that " it accepts that the signing of the Treaty marked the beginning of constitutional government in 
New Zealand, and that it recognised the special position of the Maori People". 
2 See generally Geoffrey Palmer and Matthew Palmer Bridled Power New Zealand 's Constitution and 
Government (4 ed, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2004) 346 where it is set out that "it is clear that 
the Treaty is an integral part of New Zealand's constitutional arrangements. What is not clear is the nature 
and extent of that integral part" . 
rights. I will be focusing on issues that would likely arise if the Treaty was included in a 
Constitution. 
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I also consider changes to New Zealand' s constitutional structure. The new constitutional 
structure will provide two things; firstly it will provide greater protection for Maori rights 
which flow from the Treaty and secondly it will provide a formalised framework for 
dialogue between Parliament and the courts when dealing with Treaty issues. It is 
submitted that formalising the process would enhance the ability of the parties within the 
Constitution to deal with Treaty issues constructively. 
To discuss these issues I will set out some broader constitutional background before 
dealing with issues specific to New Zealand. My paper is divided into seven parts. After 
my introduction the second part of my paper will examine the current status of the Treaty 
in New Zealand's constitutional arrangements. The third part of my paper will examine 
the concept of Parliamentary Sovereignty and the important role this plays in 
Westminster style Parliamentary democracies . In this section I will also look at the way 
Parliamentary sovereignty affects Treaty rights before contrasting the way the 
Westminster system operates with the way the system operates in the United States of 
America ("U.S"). In the fourth part of my paper I will outline some contemporary 
arguments for and against clarification of the Treaty in New Zealand's constitutional 
arrangements. In the fifth part of my paper I will look at an option for reconciling the 
Westminster and U.S models. In the sixth part of my paper I will address two issues that 
will need to be examined if the Treaty was to be included in a Constitution and then the 
final part of my paper will outline my conclusions. 
II THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE TREATY OF WA/TANG/ IN NEW 
ZEALAND'S CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
A New Zealand's Constitution 
7 
The framework for New Zealand's constitutional arrangements is broadly based on the 
Westminster system developed in England. New Zealand does not have a comprehensive 
written constitution. One description of the fundamentals of New Zealand's constitution 
sets out that the constitution is: 
to be found in formal legal documents, in decisions of the courts, and in practices (some of which are 
described as conventions). It reflects and establishes that New Zealand is a monarchy, that it is a 
parliamentary system of government, and that it is a democracy.3 
Some of the core elements of New Zealand's constitution are set out in The Constitution 
Act 1986. The Constitution Act 1986 details that the Queen is the head of state of New 
Zealand and that the Governor-General appointed by her is her representative in New 
Zealand. The Constitution Act also sets out details of the three bodies that make up 
government; the executive, the legislative and the judiciary. Other major sources of the 
constitution include: the prerogative powers of the Queen, other relevant New Zealand 
statutes, relevant English and United Kingdom statutes, decisions of the courts and 
conventions of the constitution, with the Treaty also taking an increasingly prominent 
role.4 
New Zealand's constitution is not easily defined, therefore it can mean different things to 
different people. Sir Geoffrey Palmer set out that the New Zealand constitution is neither 
readily accessible nor easily understood. He states that "the New Zealand constitution is 
flexible, to a large extent uncodified and fluid. The constitution is both malleable and 
3 Cabinet Office Cabinet Manual 2001 (Wellington, 2001) 1. 
4 Cabinet Office, above n 3, 2. 
mysterious. It is an iterative constitution in a state of constant and often silent 
evolution."5 
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Central to New Zealand's constituti.onal arrangements is the idea of Parliamentary 
sovereignty. Parliament is made up of the Queen, who as I have mentioned is represented 
in New Zealand by the Governor-General, and the House of Representatives which is 
responsible for legislative power.6 The Executive branch of government is made up of the 
Prime Minister and Cabinet. The Executive branch of government generally directs and 
controls the House of Representatives and thus legislative power. As one commentator 
set out: 
"The efficient secret of the English Constitution may be described as the close union, the nearly complete 
fusion, of the executive and legislative power ... a cabinet is a combining committee- a hyphen which joins, 
a buckle which fastens the legislative part of the State to the executive part of the State."7 
New Zealand's Parliament, through the advent of MMP has the potential to exert slightly 
more influence over the Executive, although Cabinet is still a powerful body. I will 
discuss Parliamentary sovereignty in more detail in part 3 of this paper. 
B The Current Status of the Treaty in New Zealand's Constitution 
The Treaty has become a keystone to contemporary Maori issues. 8 Despite this, the 
Treaty's current status means that the courts lack any constitutional warrant to enforce it 
until it is included in legislation.910 As one author noted, this means: "the legal system 
5 Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Palmer "The New Zealand Constitution in 2005'' (NZLS Seminar, Wellington, May 
2005) 1. 
6 The Constitution Act 1986, s 14. 
7 Walter Bagehot The English Constitution: With an introduction by RHS Crossman, M.P (3ed, C.A Watts 
& Co. Ltd, London, 1964) 65 and 66. 
8 Paul McHugh The Maori Magna Carta: New Zealand Law and the Treaty of Waitangi (Oxford University 
Press, Auckland, 1991) l. 
9 Cabinet Office, above n 3, 4. 
'
0 See Generally Philip A Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2 ed, Brookers, 
Wellington, 2001) 65 which notes that this principle was most recently endorsed by the Privy Council in 
Hoani Te Heuheu Tukino v Aotea District Maori Land Board [1941] AC 308 PC see also PG McHugh 
"What a difference a Treaty makes - the pathway of aboriginal rights jurisprudence in New Zealand public 
effectively gave the Executive a monopoly in deciding if and when to honour the 
Treaty". 11 It is left to the will of Parliament to determine when Treaty rights are 
justiciable and consequently when the courts can become involved in dialogue on the 
Treaty. 12 
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However, this fact is not as limiting as it might sound. Statutory references, whether to 
the principles of the Treaty or through other references to the Treaty, have become an 
increasingly common feature of New Zealand's legislative landscape with a sizeable 
body of legislation referring to the Treaty in the fields of fishing, conservation, state 
owned enterprises, the environment and resource management. 13 An important reason 
why so many Treaty references have been inserted in legislation is the convention set out 
in The Cabinet Manual 2001 ("Cabinet Manual"). The Cabinet Manual exists to set out 
"guidance for executive government principles, procedures and values". 14 The 
convention requires that when proposals for new legislation or "bids" are submitted to the 
Cabinet Legislation committee for approval the Minister must confirm the draft Bill 
complies with, among other things, the principles of the Treaty. 15 This convention 
ensures that consideration is given to the Treaty when legislation is being formulated and 
should ensure that the Treaty or the "principles" of the Treaty are given statutory 
recognition where it is appropriate. 
law" (2004) 15 PLR 87, 91 which notes that the New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney General 
(broadcasting assets) [1996] 3 NZLR 140, 168 (CA) per Richardson P, Gault, McKay, Henry, Keith and 
Blanchard JJ "reaffirmed the orthodoxy that treaty rights, including those associated with the one 
concluded at Waitangi in 1840, required statutory incorporation and took effect only and subject to that 
manner and recognition". 
11 Palmer Geoffrey New Zealand's Constitution in Crisis (Mclndoe, Dunedin, 1992) 74. 
12 See Generally Joseph, above n 10, 72 The Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 and the Waitangi Day Act 1976, 
contain schedules that recite the English and Maori Texts of the Treaty. However, neither statute employs 
language sufficient to incorporate the Treaty into municipal law. 
13 See generally Joseph, above n 10, 73 and 74 for a list of "major statutes that contain reference to the 
Treaty or the Maori dimension". 
14 Cabinet Office, above n 3, "forward" xiii. 
15 Cabinet Office, above n 3, 5.35-5.36, see also Joseph, above n 10, 73 which notes that "in 1986, the 
Lange Government agreed that all legislation referred to Cabinet at the policy approval stage should draw 
attention to any implications for recognition of Treaty principles" and "in 1991 the Cabinet Office Manual" 
(now the Cabinet Manual) "revised the format by which ministers make 'bids ' for the inclusion of Bills in 
the Government's legislative programme." 
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C "Principles" of the Treaty 
Statutory references have often been to the "principles" of the Treaty. This type of 
reference first occurred in The State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986 which led to the 
watershed case of New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General (the "Lands" case). 
16 
The Court of Appeal determined that under these principles "partnership" was the key 
concept defining the relationship between the Treaty parties. The concept of partnership 
under the Treaty is said to create "responsibilities analogous to fiduciary duties".
17 
Despite the "partnership", the judgment affirmed the 011hodoxy that preserves 
Parliament's powers of legislation. It set out that the Treaty is not a bill of rights or 
fundamental constitutional document: it did not fetter Parliament ' s sovereignty and it 
confirmed Treaty rights were non-justiciable in the absence of statutory incorporation. 
18 
On many occasions since the Lands case the phrase "principles" of the Treaty has been 
used in substitution for the original text of the Treaty. The use of the principles has 
helped overcome the complications of the textual differences between the English and 
Maori interpretations of the Treaty. The textual differences arise because some of the 
expressions used in the Maori text had no precise English equivalent. 19 In particular, the 
expressions "kawanatanga" from Article I of the Treaty and "rangatiratanga" from 
Article II of the Treaty could not be easily reconciled with the English versions of the 
text. The English text of Article I uses the word "sovereignty" while the Maori people 
have often interpreted the word Kawanatanga, which is used in their text, to mean one of 
complete government, governance or full sovereignty. 20 The English version of Article II 
uses the word "chieftainship." The Maori version uses the phrase rangatiratanga. One 
author states a translation of rangatiratanga is "unqualified chieftainship" which Maori 
16 New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General [1987] l NZLR 641 (CA) Cooke P, Richardson, 
Somers, Casey and Bisson JJ. 
17 New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General, above n 16, 663 Cooke P. 
18 Joseph, above n 10, 68 . 
19 Joseph, above n 10, 47 . 
20 Joseph, above n 10, 48. 
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retained over their lands, villages and 'taonga'. Taonga meaning "treasures" or "anything 
highly prized."21 I will discuss these concepts in more detail below. 
With no agreement between Maori and Pakeha on what the text actually means the Court 
of Appeal in the Lands case, and in particular three judges, called for the application of 
principles of interpretation relevant to constitutional documents - eschewing the 
"austerity of tabulated legalism."22 The Court of Appeal also renounced a "strict or literal 
interpretation of the Treaty."23 
The Court of Appeal set out that: 
In brief the basic terms of the bargain were that the Queen was to govern and the Maoris were to be her 
subjects; in return their chieftainships and possessions were to be protected, but sales of land to the Crown 
could be negotiated. These aims partly conflicted. The Treaty has to be seen as an embryo rather than a 
fully developed and integrated set of ideas.24 
The Court of Appeal viewed the Treaty as a living instrument, capable of adapting to new 
and changing circumstances. 25 One author summarised the judgement by saying that it 
addressed the spirit and principles of the Waitangi pact, the textual differences between 
the English and Maori language versions , past breaches of the Treaty, and the interpretive 
approach to statutory recognition of Treaty princi pies. 26 The principles the Court of 
Appeal developed are representative of the broader relationship between the Crown and 
the Maori people and they are often used as a paradigm within which to assess individual 
cases. 
However, the fact that there are more than thirty statutes in New Zealand that incorporate 
the Treaty in some fo1m or other has lead to interpretative difficulties. This is often due to 
21 Joseph, above n 10, 48. 
22 New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General, above n 16, 655 Cooke P. 
23 New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General, above n 16, 714 Bisson J. See also 673 Richardson J. 
24 New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General, above n 16, 663 Cooke P. 
25 New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General, above n 16, 655-656 Cooke P and at 673 per 
Richardson J. 
26 Joseph, above n 10, 67 . 
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the vague and ambiguous nature of the provisions themselves. 27 In each case new 
principles are teased out from earlier decisions. This is partly because the true 
understanding of what these principles mean and the nature of the underlying relationship 
between the Crown and Maori is yet to be completely resolved and partly because of the 
nature of our common law system. Even if a form of resolution was achieved, these 
principles would still be fluid and evolving. These interpretative difficulties have led to 
calls from some for Parliament to work out in precise terms how it wants to protect Maori 
interests and to be more explicit in legislative schemes rather than using a general 
formula. 28 
D Maori Self-Determination or Sovereignty 
Self-determination is important to Maori and some interpretations of the Treaty suggest 
that is leaves open the potential for independent Maori Sovereignty. As set out above, it 
can be argued that through ceding Kawanatanga, the Maori only ceded government and 
not sovereignty. It has also been argued that the Maori version of the treaty potentially 
assured Maori 'te tino rangitiratanga o o ratou wenua o ratou kainga me o ratou taonga 
katoa' which is interpreted as 'the unqualified exercise of their chieftainship over their 
land their villages and over all their treasures'. This chieftainship over property could be 
interpreted to approach sovereignty in its intensity of control. 29 
Even if it is resolved that self-determination does not arise from the Treaty, self-
determination is a dominant call from indigenous peoples across the world.30 One way of 
analysing the idea of Maori self determination is by looking at sovereignty according to 
what have been described as internal and external perspectives. An internal perspective 
would allow a system of Maori self-determination to operate in parallel with, and within 
the confines of, a regular unitary state system of government. If this type of system were 
to operate since both governing mechanisms would be operating contemporaneously over 
27 Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Palmer, above n 5, 15 
28 Mathew Palmer "The Treaty of Waitangi in Legislation" [2001] NZLJ 207 . 
29 Michael Belgrave, Merata Kawharu, and David Williams (eds), Waitangi Revisited: Perspectives on the 
Treaty of Waitangi (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 2005) 314. 
30 B.V Harris "The Constitutional Future of New Zealand" (2004) NZ Law Rev 295. 
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the same geographical area, a formal pluralism would have to be put in place.31 In the 
New Zealand example, this form of internal self-government would work within the 
current Westminster framework. Conversely, external self-determination implies 
secession from the post-colonial state and the development of an independent indigenous 
nation-state. 32 
I have raised this point to highlight the difference between the Parliamentary sovereignty 
which I will refer to throughout this paper and the self-determination issues which are 
also often referred to as 'sovereignty' issues. I will not be discussing self-determination 
type sovereignty issues in detail in this paper. The option for protection of Treaty rights 
proposed in this paper is based on the idea that Maori will continue to operate within 
New Zealand's present constitutional framework. 
III PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY, MINORITY RIGHTS, TREATY RIGHTS 
AND THE U.S MODEL 
Parliamentary sovereignty is a rule of the common law and plays a key role within 
Westminster systems of government.33 It also has a huge impact on the way minority 
rights are dealt with and for the purposes of this paper the way Treaty rights are dealt 
with. 
A Parliamentary Sovereignty 
The classic empirical analysis of the Westminster system was made by A.V Dicey who 
has been described by one author as the 'high priest' of orthodox constitutional theory.34 
Although there are arguably some deficiencies in his analysis, his work provides a useful 
reference point for analysing New Zealand's constitution. 
31 B.V Harris, above n 30, 295 . 
32 Mason Durie Te Mana, Te Kawanatanga - The Politics of Maori Self-Determination (Oxford University 
Press New Zealand, Auckland, 1998) 12. 
33 Paul McHugh, above, n 8, 58. 
34 Martin Loughlin Public Law and Political Theory (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992) 140. 
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Dicey identified the three guiding principles which underpinned the English constitution 
as; the legislative sovereignty of Parliament, the universal rule throughout the 
constitution of ordinary law and the role which constitutional conventions play in the 
ordering of the constitution.35 However, of these three principles he referred to 
Parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law as the "twin pillars" of the English 
constitution .36 But Dicey was also equally clear that he considered the sovereignty of 
Parliament, from a legal point of view, to be "the dominant characteristic of our political 
institutions."37 
To Dicey the p1inciple of Parliamentary sovereignty meant that Parliament, made up of 
the Queen, the House of Lords and the House of Commons, has the right to make or 
unmake any law whatever.38 He went on to state that "there is no person or body of 
persons who can, under the English constitution, make rules which override or derogate 
from an Act of Parliament."39 In the New Zealand situation his analysis translates into 
Parliament being in control. Dicey's analysis of the control of Parliament by the 
executive was limited. 
Dicey's justifications for his view of Parliamentary sovereignty are based on the manner 
in which Parliament had previously acted as well as the fact that he was able to dismiss 
any other potential sources of legislative power.40 
35 A.V Dicey The Law of The Constitution (lOed, MacMillan & Co Ltd, 1959) 35 . 
36 AV Dicey, above n 35, 183. 
37 AV Dicey, above n 35, 39. 
38 AV Dicey, above n 35, 39. 
39 AV Dicey, above n 35 , 40. 
40 See Generally P .P Craig "Dicey: Unitary, Self-Correcting Democracy and Public Law" 1990 106 (Jan) 
LQR 105, 106 where he notes that Dicey's chain of reasoning is eclectic. His views are based on in part: 
the writings of previous jurists such as Blackstone and Coke, examples of the exertion of Parliamentary 
authority in the past (in particular he looked at the Acts of Union, and the Septennial Act) and upon the fact 
that Parliament is able to interfere with private rights of citizens. Dicey also dismissed other possible 
sources of legislative power. He dismissed : the Monarch, resolutions of either house of Parliament, the vote 
of parliamentary electors, the power of the judiciary to legislate and alleged legal limitations derived from 
morality, international law, the prerogative and previous legislation. 
15 
B Minority Rights under the Westminster system 
In the Westminster system, because of its reliance on Parliamentary sovereignty, 
Parliament has primary responsibility for protecting minority rights.
41 This is perceived 
as a disadvantage by some because of what has been referred to as the 'tyranny of the 
majority' .42 In essence this means that Parliament, as sovereign, is more likely to express 
the will of the majority and not take full account of the rights of the minority. 
Dicey tried to counter this type of argument by referring to perceived limits on 
sovereignty.43 In addition to these perceived limjts he discussed his second "pillar" of the 
English constitution, the rule of law.44 
Dicey highlighted various ways that rights were better protected under a Westminster 
constitution because of the rule of law. Two of the perceived advantages are of interest to 
this paper. Firstly, Dicey thought that the way the English constitution protected minority 
rights through the common law, was more effective because of the absence "of those 
declarations of rights so dear to foreign constitutionalists".45 Dicey argued a written 
constitution could be easily swept aside. He thought an English style constitution would 
41 Se~ generally Jeffrey Goldsworthy "Homogenizing Constitutions" (2003) 23 OXJLST 483, 483 . 
42 See generally J.S Mill Utilitarianism, Liberty, Representative Government (J.M Dent & Sons Ltd, 
London, 1910) 249-250. 
43 See generally P.P Craig, above n 40, 106 where he describes Dicey's distinction between political and 
legal sovereignty and he discusses Dicey's external and internal limitations on the sovereign power of 
£arliament. 
4 See generally A.V Dicey, above n 35 , 188, 193 and 195 where Dicey sets out the three conceptions that 
make up his rule of law. These are: 
(1) that "no man is punishable or can be lawfully made to suffer in body or goods except for a distinct 
breach of law established in the ordinary legal manner before the ordinary courts of the land. In 
this sense the rule of law is contrasted with every system of government based on the exercise by 
persons in authority of wide, arbitrary, or discretionary powers of constraint"; 
(2) "not only that with us no man is above the law, but (what is a different thing) that here every man, 
whatever be his rank or condition, is subject to the ordinary law of the realm and amenable to the 
jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals" ; 
(3) "that the constitution is pervaded by the rule of law on the ground that the general principles of the 
constitution (as for example the right to personal liberty, or the right of public meeting) are with 
us the result of judicial decisions determining the rights of private persons in particular cases 
brought before the courts". 
45 A.V Dicey, above n 35, 197. 
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be more difficult to sweep aside because rights flow from the constitution.46 He preferred 
that rights were inductive rather than to be deduced from a written document. 47 Dicey 
thought that because rights in England were inherent in the ordinary law of the land they 
could only be destroyed through a revolution in the institution and manners of the 
nation.48 In light of the way the Treaty has become embedded in the New Zealand 
constitution, this argument might be quite appealing. However, I think that this 
justification is limited and I will elaborate why in the next section. 
Dicey perceived a second advantage of a Westminster constitution and its rule of law to 
be that remedies were the key to ensuring minority rights were maintained. He thought 
that the English constitution was superior to most written constitutions with a declaration 
of rights because it focused on remedies, rather than making a simple declaration. He 
makes the point that you can have a declaration of right, but if there is no will to enforce 
it, it is in effect worthless.49 He notes that "there runs through the English constitution 
that inseparable connection between the means of enforcing a right and the right to be 
enforced which is the strength of judicial legislation."50 
It is interesting to note that paradoxically, Dicey thought: 
Nor let it be supposed that this connection between rights and remedies which depends on the spirit of the 
law pervading English institutions is inconsistent with the existence of a written constitution, or even with 
the existence of constitutional declaration of rights. 51 
46 
See generally, A.V Dicey, above n 35, 197 where he sets out that "In Belgium individual rights are 
deductions drawn from the principles of the constitution, whilst in England the so-called principles of the 
constitution are inductions or generalisations based upon particular decisions pronounced by the Courts as 
to the rights of given individuals ." 
47 A.V Dicey, above n 35, 197. 
48 A.V Dicey, above n 35, 201. 
49 See generally A.V Dicey, above n 35, 198 where he sets out "whether the right to personal freedom or 
the right to freedom of worship is likely to be secure does depend a good deal upon the answer to the 
inquiry whether the persons who consciously or unconsciously build up the constitution of their country 
begin with definitions or declarations of rights , or with the contrivance of remedies by which rights may be 
enforced or secured". 
50 A.V Dicey, above n 35, 199. 
51 A.V Dicey, above n 35, 200. 
In support of this statement he relies on the constitution and remedies available in the 
U.S. This seems a remarkable statement in light of the fact that it is accepted that the 
reason that the U.S constitution can enforce these principles is because it squarely 
rejected the fundamental English constitutional doctrine of the sovereignty of 
Parliament.52 Striking down unconstitutional legislation is entirely inconsistent with 
Dicey's conception of the English constitution. 
17 
The existence of these two "superior" methods of protecting rights does not answer how a 
minority interest might be protected against the will of the majority. Dicey does not 
suggest the courts should be able to protect minority rights, other than where protections 
have been made available by Parliament through legislation or have been developed by 
the courts through the common law. For this reason a declaration of fundamental rights 
which is enforceable by the courts is seen as a more effective protection for minorities. 
Dicey wholeheartedly concluded that the English version of the rule of law protects 
minority rights better than where the rights are secured in a written constitution. 
However, in light of my previous analysis, this conclusion seems anomalous. Although I 
have disagreed with Dicey, as I have said, it is important to put Dicey's writing in 
perspective. It must be remembered that in essence Dicey was conducting an empirical 
analysis in 1885, with this in mind it is understandable that his work is not completely 
accurate in a contemporary environment. At the time of writing his observation that 
written declarations of rights had often not protected minorities in Europe was quite 
correct. Dicey was also correct in asserting that this was because they were not enforced. 
However, he stopped short of concluding that they were not enforced because they were 
subject to a sovereign power. 
It is submitted that the Diceyan style of Westminster constitution is unable to act as a 
meaningful brake on Parliamentary sovereignty, particularly when minority rights are at 
stake. Dicey himself notes that the sovereignty of Parliament and the supremacy of the 
52 Stephen Gardbaum "The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism" (2001) 49 Am.J.Comp.Law 
707 , 708 and see generally Marbury v Madison (1803) 5 US 137, 177. 
law of the land "appear to stand in opposition to each other, or to be at least 
counterbalancing forces."53 However he concludes that "this appearance is delusive."54 
Despite Dicey's valiant attempts to convince us otherwise, it does not seem to be the 
correct conclusion.55 
C Treaty Rights 
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In light of my analysis of Parliamentary sovereignty and the way the Westminster system 
'protects' minority rights through the rule of law, it is worthwhile analysing how this is 
reflective of the way Treaty rights are protected in New Zealand. 
Parliamentary sovereignty is still generally seen to be a key aspect of New Zealand's 
constitutional arrangements. 56 Maori Treaty rights, unlike the rights protected under the 
NZBORA, are protected in a traditional Westminster manner. Because of the deference 
paid to the Treaty by the executive in legislation, the common law has developed 
protection for the "principles" of the Treaty and the Treaty. These protections have been 
woven through the fabric of New Zealand's constitution. This type of protection should 
continue to evolve because of the convention in the Cabinet Manual that the Treaty is to 
be considered in relation to legislative bids. 
53 . 
A.V Dicey, above n 35,406. 
54 A.V Dicey, above n 35,406 and see also A.V Dicey, above n 36,204 the way Dicey attempts to 
reinforce the way in which the 'liberty of the subject' is protected. He sets out that the object of his treatise: 
"is not to provide minute and full information, e.g as to the habeas corpus Acts, or other enactments 
protecting the liberty of the subject; but simply to show that these leading heads of constitutional law, 
which have been enumerated, these "articles", so to speak, of the constitution, are both governed by, and 
afforded illustrations of, the supremacy throughout English institutions of, the supremacy throughout 
English institutions of the law of the land", see also A.V Dicey, above n 36,411 where he again sets out 
that England operates in a system where supremacy of the law is crucial. 
55 See generally A.V Dicey, above n 35, 414 as an illustration of a valiant attempt to convince reader that 
Parliamentary sovereignty is reconcilable with his version of the rule of law I note that Dicey sets out: "By 
every path we come round to the same conclusion, that Parliamentary sovereignty has favoured the rule of 
law, and that the supremacy of law of the land both calls forth the exertion of Parliamentary sovereignty, 
and leads to its being exercised in a spirit of legality". This 'spirit of legality' vague as it is does sound like 
something that might offer some protection to minorities under the Westminster system. Although Dicey 
mentions the 'spirit of legality' on a number of occasions, he does not elaborate on it, or indicate 1t could in 
anyway interfere with Parliamentary sovereignty. 
56 But see Sian Elias "Sovereignty in the 21 st century: Another spin on the merry-go-round" (2003) 14 PLR 
148 where the Chief Justice looks at the contemporary understandings of sovereignty and the role of 
constitutions in the 21 st century. 
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As set out above, Dicey would have imagined that Treaty rights were better secured 
because they were not in a written constitution. Dicey would have felt that attempting to 
sweep aside these rights would cause a "revolution in the institution and manners of the 
nation." I would question whether this is correct because of the way Parliamentary 
sovereignty operates in New Zealand. Winston Peters, the New Zealand First leader, 
through his Principles of the Treaty of Waitangi Deletion Bill illustrated the way Treaty 
right are subject to the will of the majority. 57 This type of Bill would wipe away much of 
the protection the Treaty currently enjoys. It would alter the Treaty's place in New 
Zealand's constitution. Although the Bill was defeated it illustrates the ease with which 
Treaty rights could be swept aside. Whether a Bill of this type would actually have 
resulted in a "revolution in the institution and manners of the nation" is unclear. 
It seems Dicey would argue that a Bill of the type suggested by Winston Peters would not 
bring an end to protection of the Treaty because of the previous court decisions and their 
existence at common law. However, the effect of the type of Bill suggested by Mr Peters 
should not be underestimated and it certainly has the potential to bring Parliament and the 
courts into conflict. Dicey would also have thought that political, as opposed to legal, 
sovereignty would prevent a Bill that was not satisfactory to the electorate being passed. 
That point also illustrates how rights are subject to the will of the majority. The 2005 
Election campaign of the leader of the National Party, Don Brash, suggests that it could 
be argued that a near majority might not be opposed to sweeping aside many of the 
Treaty protections that have been established. 
Based on Dicey ' s work, it could also be argued Treaty rights are better protected because 
they are remedy based. In the New Zealand context there is no doubt many of the Treaty 
protections have been developed through the courts. However, there are systems with 
written constitutions setting out basic rights which also provide remedies. The U.S 
system is an example of this. An important question this raises, and one which I will 
explore later in this paper, is whether setting out fundamental rights in a written 
57 Principles of the Treaty of Waitangi Deletion Bill, no 247-1. 
Constitution and providing remedies for enforcing those rights requires the rejection of 
the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty as has occurred in the U.S system. 
The Treaty is currently protected as much as the Westminster system will allow. It is 
submitted that this level of protection is not enough. The ease with which Parliament 
could choose to ignore Treaty rights seems to be a weakness in our constitutional 
framework. 
D The U.S Model 
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In the past it has been suggested that New Zealand should adopt a U.S style model of 
rights protection. This would give ultimate responsibility for upholding the rights set out 
in a Constitution to the courts.58 
This model would be very different to the way New Zealand currently deals with rights 
protection because in the U.S model their equivalent to the New Zealand Parliament is 
not sovereign. In the U.S system legislative power is legally limited and the courts are 
empowered to enforce these limits.59 
The U.S constitution rejected the Westminster ideals that currently operate in the New 
Zeala'nd system in three key areas. These illustrate the polar differences between the 
legislative and constitutional supremacy models of constitutionalism. 
Firstly, the U.S Constitution, including the bill of rights and all subsequent amendments, 
is the supreme law of the land. This is in contrast to the position in New Zealand where 
ultimately Acts of Parliament are the supreme law of the land. 60 
Secondly, the U.S constitution is entrenched in the sense that it can only be amended by 
the supermajority procedure set out in Article V of the constitution. This is different to 
58 Jeffrey Goldsworthy, above n 41,483 . 
59 Stephen Gardbaum, above 52, 708 . 
60 See generally New Zealand Bill Of Rights Act 1990, section 4 and Stephen Gardbaum, above n 53,708. 
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the position in New Zealand where the sovereignty of Parliament means that it can amend 
or repeal almost all previous legislation, including the NZBORA, by ordinary majority.
61 
Thirdly, the supremacy of the US constitution is enforced by the judiciary and they have 
the power and duty to set aside any legal rule that conflicts with it. This is in contrast to 
the position in New Zealand where, it is generally accepted, the sovereignty of 
Parliament means no court has the power to question the validity of an Act of 
Parliament.6263 The court has certain interpretative duties under the NZBORA, but as I 
have said, these do not affect the ultimate sovereignty of Parliament. 
The differences between the US and Westminster systems lead Justice Marshall, a 
United States Supreme Court judge, to conclude that there is no middle ground between 
the two systems. He stated: 
"the constitution is either a superior, paramount Jaw, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level 
with ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it"64 
This polemic view lead many countries that wanted to protect fundamental rights to adopt 
US style systems. New Zealand could adopt this type of system to ensure better 
protection for Treaty rights. However, this type of switch would not facilitate clearer 
dialogue between Parliament and Maori because the courts would have the ultimate 
decision-making power. The courts could also limit Parliaments' policy on the basis of 
rights even if that policy might have long term advantages. If the courts were to take 
these long term advantages into account when making their decision they would seem to 
be straying into the domain of what should be left to elected officials. The fact that 
undemocratically elected judges make the final decision on constitutional matters has 
been perceived as a weakness of the US model. 
61 Stephen Gardbaum, above n 52, 708 & 709. 
62 But see Sian Elias, above n 56 where the Chief Justice looks at the contemporary understandings of 
sovereignty and the role of constitutions in the 21 st century. 
63 Stephen Gardbaum, above n 52, 709. 
64 Marbury v Madison, above n 52. 
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New Zealand has a strong history of good government and it should be reticent to 
jeopardise that by adopting wholesale changes that in the long term might undermine the 
system. It would be important to try and strike a balance between good government and 
the protection of Treaty rights. 
IV ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST CLARIFICATION OF THE TREATY IN 
NEW ZEALAND'S CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
I will now analyse why it might be necessary to better protect Treaty rights and some 
contemporary arguments as to when this might be appropriate. 
A Demystifying the Treaty 
I would submit that it is necessary to demystify the Treaty because it has such a 
fundamental role to play in New Zealand's constitutional arrangements. As one author 
noted: 
a major force for constitutional development in New Zealand is the call from both Maori and non-Maori to 
better settle the Treaty of Waitangi in the constitutional order, and to ensure that the constitution provides 
for a structure and functioning of government in which both Maori and non-Maori have confidence.65 
The fact that the Treaty has only been recognised through sporadic statutory references 
seems incongruous and as I will illustrate damaging. It is acknowledged that the Maori 
people ' s hesitation at having the Treaty within the NZBORA is a major reason that it was 
not included in that legislation. However, I would suggest that this situation should now 
be remedied. The way New Zealand's constitution protects Treaty rights generates 
animosity. The public are often not able to distinguish what rights are being dealt with. 
Maori tights could actually be divided into a number of categ01ies including: 
(a) common Jaw customary rights; 
65 B.V Harris, above n 30, 289. 
(b) contemporary rights that flow from the parties obligations under the Treaty; 
(c) rights that flow from historical breaches of the Treaty; and 
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(d) the rights of Maori as a minority which do not necessarily flow from the Treaty. 
These are the rights and issues Maori would share with other minorities in New Zealand 
society. 
It seems that presently these are often bundled together as "Treaty" issues. This means 
that the majority, on whose will the Maori minority are dependant, become tired with 
what seem to be endless "Treaty" issues. This dissatisfaction from the majority inhibits 
Government ' s ability to deal with Treaty issues free from baggage generated by non-
Treaty matters. 
Including the Treaty in a Constitution would enable constitutional rights to be clearly 
identified and dealt with free from baggage. They could be distinguished from the 
separate rights issues I have outlined above and perhaps most importantly they could be 
distinguished from historic grievances. The historic grievances seem to influence the 
majority's will to deal with the Treaty and it may be that it is only once these matters 
have been dealt with that the majority might become amenable to incorporating the 
Treaty in a Constitution. 
Some of the controversy surrounding The Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 illustrates the 
confusion over "Treaty" issues. Despite the fact that it did not have anything to do with 
the Treaty, there was a misconception that it was a "Treaty" issue. This could have a 
residual impact on genuine Treaty issues in the future. 
It is also interesting to note that the Foreshore and Seabed legislation is a clear example 
of minority rights being susceptible to the will of the majority; Parliament was able to 
legislate away Maori customary rights with ease. 
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B Status Recognition 
Another reason for incorporating the Treaty in a Constitution is that it would fulfil what 
Justice Edward Durie describes as "the principle of status recognition." Justice Durie 
notes: 
Inherent in the Treaty was the recognition of Maori status as prior inhabitants . Coincidentally, status 
recognition is integral to the Maori (and probably Pacific) way. The failure to acknowledge Maori as 
having a particular status, once the Treaty was signed, is probably at the root of the subsequent troubles and 
misunderstandings. Arguably the recognition given by the Treaty should be affirmed in any new 
constitution.66 
This status recognition seems to be a strong reason in favour of incorporating the Treaty 
in a Constitution. If it is at the root of subsequent troubles and misunderstandings, this 
lack of status recognition would seem to create animosity every time the Crown and 
Maori enter dialogue. Giving status recognition to the Treaty would give a stronger base 
to the relationship between the Crown and Maori. The trick would seem to be to give 
status recognition before there has been a fundamental breakdown in that relationship. 
C A symbolic legislative reference? 
Professor Matthew Palmer has argued against incorporating the Treaty in New Zealand's 
legislative framework in a general manner. He would only advocate a general reference 
to the Treaty if it were symbolic.67 
Professor Palmer's article sets out that a useful formulation for future Treaty references 
would be: 
• a generic symbolic legislative mihi to the Treaty of Waitangi, without general legal effect; 
as Jong as it is combined with : 
66 Colin James (ed) Building the Constitution (Brebner Print, Wellington, 2000) 202 and 203. 
67 See generally Matthew Palmer, above n 28, 207-212. 
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• specific legislative provisions that achieve Parliament's specific policy purposes in attending to 
the health of the relationships between the Crown, Maori and other New Zealanders as expressed 
in the Treaty of Waitangi .68 
Below I will discuss two issues raised in Professor Palmer's article. 
1 Constitutional safeguard 
The first matter I will look at is whether the Treaty should be used as a constitutional 
safeguard. Professor Palmer's article identifies that: 
there may be extreme cases where judicial scrutiny of a specific legislative regime reveals manifest 
injustices when considered against general principles of healthy relationships as expressed in the Treaty of 
Waitangi. It is a worthwhile safeguard for the minority to enable the Courts to express this as a view. In 
these cases, anyway, the Courts are likely simply to point out the deficiency and to leave the formulation of 
a new specific regime to the policy-making and political machinery - as occurred in the Lands case. 
Despite this statement, Professor Palmer does not think that these extreme cases warrant 
inclusion of the Treaty in legislation in a general non symbolic manner. I would argue 
that these cases do warrant the inclusion of a general reference to the Treaty in a 
Constitution. Including a general reference to the Treaty in a Constitution would enable 
the courts, when required to, to interpret whether legislation has breached the Crown's 
obligations. 
As Professor Palmer points out, this is effectively what happened in the Lands case when 
the courts interpreted section 9 of the State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986. Although the 
courts were using the legislative reference to the 'p1inciples' of the Treaty and not the 
Treaty itself, the courts used section 9 to identify a potential breach of the Crown's 
obligations under the Treaty. The court of appeal took the initiative despite the fact that 
they lacked a specific vehicle, like a constitution or bill of rights , to deal with the 
68 Matthew Palmer, above n 28, 212. 
26 
Treaty. 69 As set out by Professor Palmer the Court of Appeal was able to identify the 
deficiencies and then leave it to Government to deal with the details. Sir Geoffrey 
Palmer, the Minister responsible for dealing with the deficiency identified by the courts, 
has noted "in truth the courts have done the nation a great service on Maori issues" and 
he goes on to note:70 
I think we have devised a unique New Zealand framework in which the Waitangi Tribunal, the courts, the 
executive and the Parliament all played an important role in fleshing out the nature of Treaty obligations. 
This unique New Zealand framework was developed because the courts did not have a 
specific constitutional reference to the Treaty. I would submit that the best way of 
securing this type of role for the courts in the future would be to include the Treaty in a 
Constitution as a constitutional safeguard. 
I am not certain what a generic symbolic legislative mihi to the Treaty of Waitangi would 
achieve. It would not let the courts examine the broader relationship between the Crown 
and Maori. It is submitted that this is an important role for the courts because of the fact 
that the relationship is formulated according to the "changing social, economic and 
cultural circumstances."71 
Using Professor Palmer's formula the courts would be limited to interpreting specific 
legislative provisions and working on the assumption that Parliament ' s policy work has 
correctly interpreted the nature of the relationship. If the courts felt the legislation caused 
an injustice they would be left without a general legislative reference with which to 
identify that injustice. This would either require the courts to be 'creative' in its 
interpretation of the legislation so as to allow it to be used to identify the injustice or to 
69 See Generally, The Right Honourable Sir Geoffrey Palmer, above n 11 , 89 where he sets out that by 
taking the initiative he meant that the courts had to interpret the legislation in a manner that was beyond 
conventional statutory interpretation. Sir Geoffrey Palmer noted that "to win the courts would have to read 
down the very specific provisions in section 27 in order to make section 9 controlling. Conventional 
statutory interpretation would dictate victory for the Crown, I thought. I was wrong and so was the 
Solicitor-General. The Court of Appeal held that the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi overrode 
everything else in the Act" . 
70 The Right Honorable Sir Geoffrey Palmer, above n 11 , 93 . 
71 Matthew Palmer, above n 28, 207 . 
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let the injustice go. Neither of these solutions seems optimal and it would seem that a 
general constitutional provision allowing the courts to undertake a more open and honest 
assessment would be best. 
In his article Professor Palmer sets out that Parliament should be doing the hard policy 
work before references to the Treaty are put into legislation. He sets out that if they were 
doing this general Treaty references should not be necessary.72 I agree that this is the best 
scenario. If courts were to become involved in policy development over time it would 
undermine their role. But it is submitted that short of development of policy the courts 
should still be able to act as a check where a perceived injustice is taking place. The 
ability to check is an element of the process that has become crucial to developing the 
Treaty relationship between the Crown and the Maori people. Retaining it would help 
maintain a healthy relationship between the Crown and Maori. 
2 Symbolism 
The second matter I will look at is Professor Palmer's discussion of whether the Treaty 
could be included in New Zealand's constitution in a symbolic manner. He states that 
symbolism is important and in support of this proposition he states that "the normative 
value of symbolism is a core element of the force of constitutional conventions".73 I 
would agree with this statement, however, I think the reference to constitutional 
conventions clouds the analysis of this matter. I do not think symbolic enactment of the 
Treaty would create a new convention. 
(a) Conventions 
Conventions have been described as "standards found in previous political practice, or 
precedents, which are accepted as binding by the persons whom the standards purport to 
72 Matthew Palmer, above n 28. 
73 Matthew Palmer, above n 28, 209. 
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govern."74 Examples of conventions include "collective cabinet responsibility, individual 
ministerial responsibility, and the restraint on the Governor-General's exercise of 
power."75 It is submitted that the insertion of the Treaty in legislation in a "symbolic" 
manner does not appear to create a "binding" practice. 
Sir lvor Jennings stated that, when establishing a convention three questions must be 
asked: first, what are the precedents; secondly, did the actors in the precedent believe 
they were bound by a rule; and thirdly, is there a reason for the rule?76 I am not sure a 
symbolic reference to the Treaty would fulfil all three of these categories and thereby 
create a convention. 
However, conventions are by their very nature vague and it could certainly be argued that 
a symbolic reference might create a "weak convention."77 But I would suggest it is less 
like a convention and more like "a statement of general political practice."78 By contrast, 
New Zealand does have the strong convention that is identified in the Cabinet Manual 
that Ministers must draw attention to any aspects of Bills that have implications for, or 
may be affected by the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. 79 This does not create the 
same type of constitutional safeguard as a reference to the Treaty in a Constitution would, 
but it does creates a positive obligation on which Parliament is required to act. 
I would question whether placing a symbolic reference to the Treaty in New Zealand' s 
constitutional environment would create symbolism or ensure it took on normative value. 
It is submitted that a convention can take on a purely symbolic and normative value when 
it is generally considered to be no longer useful. However, I do not think a statement of 
general political practice can take on purely symbolic or normative value because it can 
never be used. 
74 David Feldman (ed) English Public Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004) 15. 
75 Palmer and Palmer, above n 2, 5. 
76 Paul McHugh, above n 8, 17. 
77 Feldman, above n 74, 15. 
78 Feldman, above n 74, 15. 
79 Cabinet Office, above n 3, 70. 
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If at some stage in the future all Treaty issues between the Crown and Maori had been 
resolved then the convention from the Cabinet Manual, for example, may take on a 
purely symbolic role and strict adherence to this convention might no longer be 
necessary. Despite this, the symbolic value of the convention would likely continue. It 
could become a subtle reminder of the difficulties the constitution had experienced in the 
past in relation to the Treaty and the work that had been done to resolve those difficulties. 
The convention that the Governor-General or Sovereign must assent to legislation is an 
example of this type of process. Hist01ically the sovereign had the ability to refuse to 
assent to legislation. However, over time Parliamentary sovereignty became more settled. 
A strong convention evolved that the sovereign must assent to legislation. Today this 
process is so settled it is questionable whether this convention is still necessary. It is 
arguable whether the Governor-General still holds the power to refuse to assent to 
legislation at all. 80 If the power to refuse to assent to legislation no longer exists a 
positive convention of this nature seems redundant. It would seem that the convention has 
taken on a symbolic value. It reminds us that Parliament has not always had the absolute 
monopoly on power it currently enjoys. 81 
(b) Treaty relationship 
It 1s submitted that it would be difficult for the Treaty to have a symbolic or normative 
value without resolution of the fundamentals of the Treaty relationship between the 
Crown and Maori. A purely symbolic reference might confuse what is already a muddled 
Treaty landscape and is likely to remind the parties of the work that has not been done 
and the differences that still remain. I am also unsure whether it would deal with the need 
80 See generally Joseph, above n 10,665, who sets out that the Governor-General's reserve powers include 
the right to "refuse the royal assent to a bill where to grant the royal assent would be unlawful or would 
irreparably impair representative democracy" this can be compared with Palmer and Palmer, above n 2, 57 
which does not describe the power to refuse royal assent to legislation as a reserve power and thinks of it as 
a power that is "so reserved as to be of a qualitatively different nature" to the other reserve powers. 
81 See generally Joseph, above n 10, 645 there was a time in English constitutional history when there was 
competition between the Crown and Parliament for power. Although he notes the royal veto has not been 
exercised since 1707 when Queen Anne refused assent to a bill for settling the militia in Scotland. 
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for 'status recognition' that I discussed above. This symbolic status might be acceptable 
to Maori, but it could equally be considered demeaning. 
Before there can be a purely symbolic reference to the Treaty in New Zealand' s 
constitution there needs to be more dialogue and hard work on the broad parameters of 
the relationship between the Crown and Maori . It is submitted that the courts can help 
with this process, as has been the case in the past. A general reference to the Treaty in our 
Constitution, that has more than symbolic value, would enable this to happen. Once the 
relationship is more settled, then it could take on a symbolic value. The challenge is to 
ensure the relationship between the Crown and Maori is not ineparably damaged before 
this dialogue begins. Damage may occur if New Zealand implements too many policies 
that fray the already volatile relationship between the Crown and Maori. 
I agree with Professor Palmer's proposition that courts should not be left to deal with 
policy issues. That would ultimately undermine the position of the courts in New 
Zealand's constitutional framework. However, historically the courts have been adept at 
augmenting and assisting with the discussion between Parliament and Maori. The courts 
role should be to continue to identify where there is a deficiency in legislation and to send 
it back to Parliament to deal with the substantive policy issues. It is submitted the best 
way to enable this to happen would be to incorporate a general reference to the Treaty in 
a Constitution. 
Finally, I agree with Professor Palmer that specific references to the Treaty would be 
best. However, it is submitted that these will only come once the broader issues have 
been resolved. 
D The Views of the Maori People 
Historically the Maori people have been wary of incorporating the Treaty into a positive 
law or Constitution because it would mean that the Treaty could potentially be amended. 
For this reason some Maori favoured the Treaty retaining its existing status as a historical 
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document. By doing this not only could the Treaty avoid amendment it could also retain 
its "mana." As it stands at the moment it has a unique status and influence effectively 
sitting outside the Jaw .82 However, this unique status is limiting. The fact that it sits 
outside the law is different to the way a U.S style constitution could be described as 
sitting above law. The U.S style constitution is "the supreme law of the land" and 
prevails in the case of conflict with any other legal rule, federal or state. 83 Through sitting 
outside the Jaw the Treaty continues to rely on the will of Parliament for recognition. 
History has shown this recognition is not always forthcoming. In light of the influential 
role the courts have played in assisting with the development of Treaty rights, it would 
seem logical to incorporate the Treaty in a Constitution to ensure its justiciability. 
It is unclear whether Maori would support incorporating the Treaty in a Constitution. 
When New Zealand considered making the Treaty "part of the fundamental law of New 
Zealand" by incorporating it within a NZBORA some Maori opposed its inclusion for 
similar reasons to those I have already outlined. 84 These views ultimately prevented the 
Treaty being included in the NZBORA. If a large segment of the Maori population 
oppose incorporation of the Treaty in a Constitution it will not happen. Without a firm 
proposal to enact the Treaty in some way it is difficult to assess what the views of the 
Maori people might be. The most recent expression of Maori feelings in relation to New 
Zealand's constitutional arrangements was made in submissions to the Parliamentary 
Constitutional Arrangements Select Committee which assessed New Zealand' s 
constitutional arrangements. I will highlight three submissions which made reference to 
enacting the Treaty: 
Te Runanga O Kirikiriroa Trust (Inc) set out that they believe the Treaty is fundamental 
to any codified constitution for New Zealand. They state the Articles of the Treaty must 
82 Harris, above n 30, 292. 
83 Gardbaum, above n 52, 708. 
84 See generally Palmer and Palmer, above n 2, 321. 
take precedence over the Principles of the Treaty and they should be doubly entrenched 
within the resultant document and/or legislation;85 
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Te Runanga A lwi O Ngapuhi submit that the rights and obligations which flow from the 
Treaty should be constitutionally recognised and protected. This can be achieved by 
formally incorporating the Treaty into our constitution; and86 
The Treaty Tribes Coalition supported the idea of two sovereigns. But also set out that 
their primary concern "is to see the Treaty given full effect by being enshrined in 
constitutional legislation , such that both subsequent legislation and actions of the 
executive can be tested against it in the ordinary courts."87 
It is difficult to determine how representative the submissions on the Treaty are. There 
are submissions both for and against incorporation of the Treaty in a Constitution. 
However, the fact that parts of Maoridom are now of their own volition suggesting that 
the Treaty should be incorporated into a constitution may indicate that attitudes have 
changed from those that existed prior to the NZBORA being enacted. The submissions 
also indicate that the issue of internal and external sovereignty is likely to be important. 
Perhaps parts of Maoridom are now more aware of the power of Parliamentary 
sovereignty and the way it has the potential to limit the influence of the Treaty. As 
outlined previously, although the Foreshore and Seabed legislation was in relation to 
customary rights and not Treaty rights , it should certainly have illustrated to Maori the 
power of Parliamentary sovereignty. 
Mason Durie notes that many Maori would support "an opportunity to develop a written 
constitution within which the Treaty of Waitangi was entrenched and the position of 
85 Te Runanga O Kirikiriroa Trust (Inc) "Submission to the Inquiry to Review New Zealand 's 
constitutional arrangements" <http://www.constitutional.parliament.govt.nz> (last accessed Monday 25 
July 2005). 
86 Te Runanga A Iwi O Ngapuhi "Submission to the Inquiry to Review New Zealand's constitutional 
arrangements" <http://www.constitutional.parliament.govt.nz> (last accessed Monday 25 July 2005). 
87 The Treaty Tribes Coalition "Submission to the Inquiry to Review New Zealand ' s constitutional 
arrangements" <http://www.constitutional.parliament.govt.nz> (last accessed Monday 25 July 2005) . 
Maori as the indigenous people enhanced". 88 Again, it is difficult to know how 
representative this view is. It would seem further wide spread discussion of this issue 
within Maoridom would need to take place before this could be gauged. 
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THE TREATY AND RECONCILING THE WESTMINSTER MODEL AND THE U.S 
SYSTEM 
It is submitted the Treaty should be incorporated in New Zealand's constitutional 
arrangements. How it is to be incorporated is important and it is submitted that the New 
Zealand constitutional environment should attempt to strike a balance between good 
government and the protection of Treaty rights. I would not advocate a wholesale change 
to a U.S style system. A U.S style system would not create an environment for the courts 
to facilitate dialogue between Parliament, as the legislator, and Maori. I would advocate 
that New Zealand strengthen its current system of rights protection by including the 
Treaty in a modified version of New Zealand's hybrid constitutional model. 
A Rights Protection by the Courts under the NZBORA 
Through the NZBORA, New Zealand has developed what is described as a hybrid 
constitutional model. New Zealand, Canada and Britain have all created hybrid models 
and attempted to infuse minority rights into their constitutional framework without 
abandoning Parliamentary sovereignty. They have all adapted their governing principles 
to place individual rights more squarely at the forefront when assessing the legitimacy of 
legislative and executive action. 89 These 'hybrid' models incorporate the dominant 
aspects of the Westminster and the U.S systems and challenge the polemic view of 
constitutions set out in Marbury v Madison by Justice MarshalI.9091 Hybrid models 
present the possibility of a continuum stretching from the Westminster idea of absolute 
legislative supremacy to the U.S model of a fully constitutionalised bill of rights with 
88 Durie, Mason, above n 32, 234. 
89 Jane L Hiebert "New Constitutional Ideas: Can New Parliamentary Models Resist Judicial Dominance 
When Interpreting Rights?" (2003-2004) 82 Tex. L Rev. 1963, 1965. 
90 See generally Marbury v Madison, above n 53. 
91 Goldsworthy, above n 41,483. 
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various intermediate positions in between. New Zealand's history of good government 
ensured that it was reluctant to abandon the idea of Parliamentary sovereignty. But since 
World War two countries have also wanted to ensure effective protection, and express a 
commitment to, fundamental human rights and liberties.92 New Zealand's unique 
circumstances also mean that Treaty rights also require effective protection. Treaty rights 
are not specifically protected under the NZBORA, one way this could be achieved would 
be by including a general Treaty clause within the NZBORA. 
Hybrid models attempt to do two things. Firstly they attempt "to create institutional 
balance, joint responsibility, and deliberative dialogue between courts and legislatures in 
the protection and enforcement of fundamental rights". 93 They do this by granting the 
courts the power to protect rights without giving them supremacy. The legislature still 
has the final word.94 This procedure has been said to decouple judicial review from 
judicial supremacy. Secondly the hybrid model ensures attention to tights in the 
legislative process. I will look at both these aspects of the hybrid system below. 
B Rights Protection by the Courts in New Zealand 
The NZBORA transfers important rights protection powers to the courts. It gives the 
courts the power to control the meaning of statutes in a way that is alien to traditional 
canons of statutory construction, but the NZBORA is still consistent with the orthodoxy 
of Parliamentary sovereignty.95 The NZBORA gives a framework for determining how 
all other ordinary statutes are to be given meaning. If and only if a statute cannot be 
interpreted consistently with the NZBORA will the statute trump the rights .96 However, 
in New Zealand the decoupling of judicial review from judicial supremacy is not as clear 
as it is in Canada and the United Kingdom and there is competition between section 4 and 
6 of the NZBORA. The purpose of section 6 is to ensure that the courts take the most 
92 Gardbaum, above n 52, 709. 
93 Gardbaum, above n 52, 708. 
94 Gardbaum, above n 52, 707. 
95 Gardbaum, above n 52, 714. 
96 Gardbaum, above n 52, 714. 
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charitable interpretation of a statute to ensure that it complies with the NZBORA.97 The 
purpose of section 4 is to "assert and preserve parliamentary sovereignty and to immunise 
legislation from judicial invalidation."98 This point is highlighted as a problem by 
Andrew Butler when he sets out that the NZBORA gives ultimate responsibility to the 
courts for protecting both fundamental rights as well as Parliamentary sovereignty. 
Because the courts are relying on statutory interpretation they must resolve these rival 
claims themselves. He advocates that the courts should be able to rely on the legislature 
having to squarely exercise its own sovereignty claim through a special mechanism as is 
the case in Canada and the United Kingdom.99 It is submitted that the NZBORA would 
be enhanced if the legislature was responsible for and required to take the political 
consequences of any assertion of Parliamentary sovereignty. 
A better example of this type of decoupling in the New Zealand context occurred in the 
Lands case. In that case the judiciary stepped in to identify the potential breach of the 
Crown's obligations under the Treaty, but left it to the legislature to work out how to 
avoid the potential breach. To strengthen New Zealand's current hybrid system we 
should be aiming for a process that replicates what occurred in the Lands case. By doing 
this New Zealand would ensure rights protection involved dialogue between the legislator 
97 See generally Andrew Butler, "The Bill of Rights Debate: Why the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
is a bad model for Britain" (1997) 17 Ox J Leg St 323,326 see also the New Zealand Bill of rights Act 
1990 section 6 which sets out: 
"Wherever an enactment can be given a meaning that is consistent with the rights and freedoms contained 
in this Bill of Rights, that meaning shall be preferred to any other meaning." 
98 
Andrew Butler, above n 97, 325 see also section 4 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 which 
sets out that: 
"No court shall, in relation to any enactment (whether passed or made before or after the commencement of 
this Bill of Rights), 
(a) Hold any provision of the enactment to be impliedly repealed or revoked, or to be in any way invalid or 
ineffective; or 
(b) Decline to apply any provision of this enactment by reason only that the provision is inconsistent with 
any provision of this Bill of Rights." 
99 See generally Butler, above, n 97,336 where he notes the conflict between section 6 and section 4 of the 
NZBORA, he sets out: section 6 is informed by the view that statutory language is malleable and that text 
is open to several interpretations by the reader. Once told how a text is to be read-here, in a manner 
consistent with the Bill of Rights-courts can (attempt to) divine a meaning in the words which complies 
with human rights standards. Inherent in s4, however, is the notion that a statute has particular purposes and 
a bounded set of possible meanings. The conundrum which faces a court then is that if Parliament used 
words which at first glance look as if they cut across rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights 
how can it know that that was not indeed Parliament's intention, if those words reflect the legislative 
policy? The answer, of course, is that it does not. . . thus, it will be seen that s 4 and 6 pull in different 
directions making their interaction an uneasy one. 
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and the courts. In the Lands case the legislator passed the legislation, the courts identified 
the deficiency and then returned it to the legislator for the hard policy work. The 
legislator then devised a solution that was acceptable to everyone. When discussing the 
case Sir Geoffrey Palmer, the Minister responsible for devising the solution, noted, 
"Hammering out those details was one of the most challenging tasks I ever faced as 
Minister", despite the fact that it was no simple task the method in which the matter was 
dealt with "turned out to be satisfactory to everyone." 100 The Lands case illustrates that 
the hybrid model of rights protection can work as long as all parties play their appropriate 
role. The Lands case resulted in what Sir Geoffrey Palmer described as a rather elegant 
solution. 101 As already noted, the solution required hard work, but this is the type of 
process New Zealand should be aiming for in regard to Treaty issues. New Zealand 
should be looking to ensure hard work by the democratically elected legislator creates 
good outcomes. It is submitted a modified hybrid model could ensure this is achieved. 
Canada and the United Kingdom have already attempted to create models which replicate 
the type of dialogue that occurred in the Lands case. I will now briefly assess how the 
hybrid models developed in those two countries. 
B Rights Protection by the Courts in Canada 
Canada has judicial enforcement of their Charter Rights, but these for the most part are 
subject to section 33 of their Charter. 102 Section 33 permits legislatures by express 
provision to override many of the rights protected by the Charter. 103 All that is necessary 
is the enactment of a law containing an express declaration that the law is to operate 
notwithstanding the relevant provision of the Charter. Once this declaration has been 
enacted, the Jaw that it protects will not be touched by the overridden provision of the 
Charter. Through section 33 the principle of Parliamentary sovereignty has been retained, 
100 The Right Honorable Sir Geoffrey Palmer, above n 11, 90-93. 
101 The Right Honorable Sir Geoffrey Palmer, above n 11, 90. 
102 The Constitution Act 1982, s33(1). 
103 See generally The Constitution Act 1982, s 33(1) sets out that: 
"Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare in an Act of Parliament or of the 
legislature, as the case may be, that the Act or a provision thereof shall operate notwithstanding a provision 
included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of this Charter". 
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although the weakness of the Canadian model is that in practice the power of override is 
seldom used. 104 Because the power is seldom used, in effect, the courts always end up 
having the final say. Once the courts strike down legislation the legislature has generally 
not had the will to use the override. As set out above, the potential strength of this type of 
system appears to be the dialogue between the courts and the legislature. Although the 
Canadian system has the potential to create meaningful dialogue, it is currently failing on 
that front. 
It is submitted that a Canadian style system could be effective in New Zealand if the 
courts and legislator used it to generate a healthy dialogue. 
As an aside, it is also worth noting that in the Canadian model the Constitution Act 1982 
includes a section which protects indigenous rights. Section 35(1) of the Constitution Act 
1982 sets out that "existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of 
Canada are hereby recognised and affirmed." This illustrates that the Treaty could be 
included in this type of document. 
C Rights Protection by the Courts in the United Kingdom 
The British Human Rights Act 1998 ("HRA") also aims to give further effect to rights 
without giving them the status of supreme law. Again, there is an attempt to create inter-
institutional dialogue. The HRA is along similar lines to the NZBORA except that it 
allows a "declaration of incompatibility" if primary legislation cannot be interpreted in a 
manner consistent with convention rights. 105 However, Parliamentary sovereignty is 
maintained because there is no legal duty on Parliament to remedy the incompatible 
legislation. In spite of this fact "the government has repeatedly stated its belief that the 
normal course of action would be that such a declaration will almost certainly prompt the 
Government and Parliament to change the law." 106 If the government follows this course 
104 Goldsworthy, above n 41,483. 
105 Hiebert, above n 89, 1976. 
106 Gardbaum, above n 52, 716. 
of action it again seems that the courts have the final say. If this is the case the 
constitutional actors are not utilising what could be an advantage of their system. 
D Criticisms of the Canadian and British Hybrid Models 
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One author has suggested that the fact that the Canadian legislator are reluctant to use 
section 33, and the emerging British assumption that Parliamentary sovereignty does not 
mean that government should act in a manner inconsistent with judicial interpretations of 
rights (as inferred from judicial declarations of incompatibility), means that from a 
judicial review perspective these models seem exceedingly close to the U.S model. 107 
However, it is interesting to note the articles conclusions. The author states that there is 
no reason to assume that the hybrid model is inferior to the U.S model of protecting 
rights. In fact in some ways the author suggests that it might be superior. The author 
notes her only caution: 108 
does not arise out of any inherent conceptual shortcomings with this model, but from the strong influence 
of American constitutional ideas. Despite the innovative approach these models take, it remains to be seen 
to what extent these political communities can resist the emphasis on judicial hegemony when interpreting 
rights and resolving legislative conflicts where rights claims arise. 
The author also notes that: 109 
Only time will tell whether it is possible to establish a bill of rights that will evolve in a manner that can 
resist the notion that judicial hegemony is required for responsible judgements about rights . 
These comments, far from resigning hybrid models to the scrap heap, seem to offer hope 
that these models might evolve in a satisfactory manner if they can throw of the dominant 
U.S ideology. 
The fact that one of the New Zealand legal systems most important Treaty cases, the 
Lands case, was decided in a way that allowed inter-institutional dialogue illustrates that 
107 Hiebert, above n 89, 1980. 
108 Hiebert, above n 89, 1986. 
109 Hiebert, above n 89, 1987. 
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the hybrid model can work. The current shortcomings of the Canadian and British models 
seem to fall at the feet of the actors within the system, rather than the system itself. 
E Advantages of the Canadian and British Hybrid Models over the Traditional 
Westminster System and the U.S System 
1 Westminster system 
An obvious advantage of the hybrid model is that it allows rights protection and 
Parliamentary sovereignty to be accommodated within the same system. When compared 
with the traditional Westminster system, the hybrid model would also have the advantage 
of allowing the Treaty to be protected in a clearer manner and enable the courts to act as a 
brake on the "tyranny of the majority". 
New Zealand currently has an ad hoe system of protecting Treaty rights. It is submitted 
that the protection could be improved by protecting them as part of a modified hybrid 
model that creates dialogue between the courts and the legislator. 
2 U.S system 
A U.S style system of 1ights protection has previously been identified as a model New 
Zealand should consider. 110 Gardbaum who has set out detailed analysis of the hybrid 
model outlines four potential advantages that the hybrid model has over the U.S model. I 
will assess these potential advantages in light of my discussion of the Lands case and the 
way Treaty protection should operate. 
110 See generally "A Bill of Rights for New Zealand - A White Paper" (Government Printer, Wellington, 
1985) 68 which suggested a U .S style supreme Jaw. It included a supreme law provision which set out: 
"This Bill of Rights is the supreme law of New Zealand, and accordingly any law (including existing law) 
inconsistent with this Bill shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be of no effect." 
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(a) Protecting fundamental Treaty rights without limiting the legislative process 
One of the criticisms often directed at the U.S style system is that because legislatures do 
not have final responsibility they have a tendency to leave matters of constitutionality and 
rights to the courts. It is thought that over time, this devaluation of legislative discourse 
has the potential to sap the self-governing capacity of the people and may displace public 
in favour of private interest. 111 The hybrid model attempts to avoid this problem by 
giving the democratically elected legislature the potential to have the final say. 
Treaty issues can be unpopular with the electorate. This is illustrated by the legislature's 
general reluctance to deal with them. If the courts were to become the final decision-
maker on Treaty issues it is likely to increase litigation in relation to these issues and 
enable the legislator to avoid dealing with the tough Treaty issues. An associated problem 
would be that if the courts are left to deal with the tough issues, over time it might make 
them unpopular with the public and damage their legitimacy. It would cause 
constitutional problems if the courts faced resistance from the general public. These are 
important reasons why the democratically elected legislator should be the final decision-
maker on Treaty issues. 
(b) Avoiding Politicisation of the Courts 
As previously discussed, when courts decide Treaty issues they essentially look at two 
matters. Firstly, whether the right has been infringed and secondly whether there is an 
overriding policy interest that allows that infringement. There is often a sense that where 
the courts are dealing with the second type of issues they are in danger of straying too 
close to the terrain of policy and preference.
112 Again, over time if courts make decisions 
involving policy and preference this might undermine the public perception of the courts 
and potentially politicise their role. 
111 Gardbaum, above n 52, 721. 
112 Gardbaum, above n 52, 722. 
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In the New Zealand context, the courts could continue to be involved in determining the 
scope of Treaty rights. In the Lands case and in subsequent cases the courts have shown 
themselves to be adept at identifying where the legislator has potentially infringed a 
Treaty right. Beyond this identification, it would be better if courts left it up to the 
legislator to make the difficult political or policy decisions. By adopting the hybrid model 
for Treaty issues New Zealand could formalise a process that has already proven to be 
successful. 
( c) Making rights discourse into a more inter-institutional dialogue113 
It is also hoped that dialogue between Parliament and the courts would improve 
constitutional analysis of Treaty issues. The courts could identify the issues and the 
legislator would then decide whether they should change or override the legislation. The 
legislator is in the best position to make this decision because they are democratically 
accountable. 
In the New Zealand context the courts have already been utilised to assist with Treaty 
issues. As mentioned, they have proved themselves to be a useful partner in dealing with 
these issues. It would be important that discourse between the legislature and the courts 
was understood to be part of the process. If this was the case it would assist in ensuring 
that healthy, rather than divisive and destructive discourse was maintained. Again the 
Lands case is a good example of the way the system can work. 
(d) Reducing the tension between judicial protection of Treaty rights and democratic 
d · • k" 114 eciswn ma mg. 
If the courts role is a checking one, the legislator will still have ultimate responsibility 
and power. If the courts role is a trumping one the legislator might at times feel that the 
courts are interfering inappropriately. If this was the case it would be likely to raise 
113 Gardbaum, above n 52, 721. 
114 Gardbaum, above n 52, 721. 
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tensions between the courts and the legislator. However, if both institutions are clear 
what their roles are and checking was understood to be part of the process, a healthy 
discourse could be maintained. Historically the New Zealand government has been quite 
amenable to involving the courts in the development of Treaty principles by including 
general Treaty clauses in legislation. The Lands case was a good example of how the 
courts should act. 
F Incorporating the Treaty into a Hybrid Model 
It is submHted that the final decision on Treaty matters should be left to those who are 
democratically accountable. However, the courts have proven themselves to be useful in 
assisting with Treaty issues. In light of the way the process used in the Lands case was 
able to resolve a difficult situation it seems a logical step for New Zealand to develop its 
own variant of the Canadian or British model which included the Treaty. Formalisation of 
the process would ensure ongoing protection for Treaty rights and it would also clarify 
the process and ensure a formalised rather than ad hoe role for the courts. This would 
enable New Zealand's hybrid model to evolve to enable inter-institutional dialogue. A 
fine tuning of the process, rather than a complete overhaul, seems like the best solution. 
G Attention to Rights During the Legislative Process 
The second feature of the hybrid system I referred to is the political review of proposed 
legislation. In Canada this occurs through executive scrutiny, while in New Zealand and 
Britain this occurs through vetting. 
Section 7 of the NZBORA requires what are described as vets. This check is meant to 
ensure that proposed legislation does not breach any of the rights protected by the Act. If 
a proposed Act does breach the NZBORA it puts the onus on the legislature to justify the 
departure from NZBORA standards. 
As set out earlier, the Cabinet Manual includes a convention that requires those proposing 
Bills to identify the potential impact on the Treaty. Again it seems incongruous that other 
minority rights are afforded this type of protection through the NZBORA, yet Treaty 
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rights are protected through a convention. This is another example of the way the system 
forces Treaty rights to be dealt with in a different manner to other minority rights. The 
fact that the system forces many Treaty rights to be dealt with in a different manner to 
other minority rights may be contributing to the perception held by some that Maori are 
getting "special treatment" under New Zealand law. It is submitted that this is one area 
where the Treaty could be brought into line with other minority rights. 
The fact that rights are protected in different parts of the constitutional process seems to 
be an advantage of the hybrid model. In effect the courts role is a back up role and it is 
hoped that intervention by the courts can be avoided by thorough rights analysis during 
the legislative process. 
The two protection methods offered by the hybrid model would ensure that Treaty 
matters were dealt with appropriately. More detailed analysis of the various models and 
New Zealand's constitutional goals would need to be conducted before adopting a 
modified hybrid model, but it would seem that New Zealand should continue along the 
hyb1id model evolutionary path on which it has embarked. 
IV THE PRACTICALITIES OF ENACTING THE TREATY? 
The final stage of my analysis will look at two practical issues associated with enacting 
the Treaty in a Constitution which might prevent it from being a viable option. Firstly, I 
will examine whether "principles" of the Treaty or the text of the Treaty should be 
incorporated into legislation. Secondly, I will assess whether the Treaty should be 
incorporated through ordinary legislation or in a form of higher law. 
(a) Should the "principles" of the Treaty or the Text of the Treaty be incorporated? 
Whether the text of the Treaty or the "principles" of the Treaty should be incorporated 
into a Constitution would be an important issue. As outlined previously, the textual 
differences between the Maori and English versions mean that agreement on the meaning 
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of the Treaty text may be hard to establish.' 15 These difficulties have in part been 
circumvented by general references to the Treaty. An example of this is the reference to 
the "principles" of the Treaty used in section 9 of the State Owned Enterprises Act 1986. 
A large body of jurisprudence has developed around the various legislative references to 
the Treaty and in exceptional cases jurisprudence has developed where there has been no 
reference to the Treaty in legislation. 116 Since the Lands case, textual differences between 
the Maori and English versions of the Treaty have not been as important because of the 
fact that the courts had outlined "what matters is the spirit of the Treaty."
117 
Sentiments 
about the nature of the relationship are also expressed by Sir Douglas Graham, he set 
out: 118 
It is worth remembering that the Treaty is a pact of goodwill between peoples. If approached with a 
generosity of spirit, there is no reason why that pact should not succeed as a symbol of an ongoing 
relationship between peoples based on notions of trust, respect, and dignity. 
The question to be addressed is how best to represent this Treaty 'relationship' if it were 
to be incorporated into New Zealand law. Some suggest it would be preferable to 
continue to use the "principles" rather than the text because of the historical nature of the 
text. However, this could be offensive to Maori and it is questionable whether it would be 
a viable proposition. 
It is submitted that the 'relationship' and the 'principles of the Treaty' flow from the 
Treaty text as signed in 1840. Therefore these 'p1inciples' would be relevant even if the 
text of the Treaty were inserted in legislation. The text of the Treaty would be a starting 
point with the 'principles ' supplying the meaning of the relationship between the Crown 
115 I will not be referring to the rule of contra proferentum rule in this paper. This is the rule which is 
applied to bilingual treaties and dictates that in cases of ambiguity a treaty is to be interpreted against the 
party drafting it, see generally e-government <http://www.e-government.govt.nz>. 
116 See generally Huakina Development Trust v Waikato Valley Authority [1987] 2 NZLR 188,210 (HC) 
for an instance where the Treaty was used as an aid to interpretation because it was "part of the fabric of 
New Zealand society". 
11 7 The Right Honorable Sir Geoffrey Palmer, above n 11, 89. 
11 8 Ken S Coates and PG McHugh Living Relationships Kokiri Ngatahi: The Treaty of Waitangi in the New 
Millenium (Victoria University Press , Wellington, 1998) 7. 
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and Maori. Ultimately, interpretation of the meaning of the text would need to be 
negotiated between the Crown and Maori. Where necessary, this could be augmented by 
input from the courts . 
Enacting the Treaty text would also enable the Treaty to evolve as the relationship 
between the Crown and Maori developed in the same way that the "principles" of the 
Treaty have continued to evolve. A form of constitution has been proposed which 
includes the text of the Treaty as well confirmation that the rights of Maori people and 
that the Treaty "shall be considered as always speaking and shall be applied to 
circumstances as they arise so that effect may be given to its spirit and intent."
119 
It is 
submitted that this would provide an excellent starting point for the discussion of the way 
the Treaty might be incorporated into a Constitution within a hybrid model. 
(b) Should the Treaty be entrenched? 
How the Treaty is to be enacted would also be an important issue. For reasons already 
outlined, it would of particular sensitivity to Maori who would be concerned about 
Government's ability to amend the Treaty. 
On this issue, I think it is important to remember that if the Treaty was enacted, it would 
not mean that the original document ceased to exist. If the text of the Treaty was 
incorporated into a constitution and in the unlikely situation that at some stage Parliament 
did want to change the text of the Treaty, the original document would still sit outside the 
law and could be seen as a touchstone of the true meaning of the Treaty. The fact that the 
Treaty text had been incorporated would be a manifestation of the original Treaty, but it 
119 See generally Palmer and Palmer, above n 2, Appendix Part II which sets out: 
THE TREATY OF WAIT ANGI!fE TIRITI O WAIT ANGI 
4. The Treaty of Waitangirfe Tiriti o Waitangi - (l) The rights of the Maori people under the Treaty of 
Waitangi/Te Tiriti o Waitangi are hereby recognised and affirmed. 
(2) The Treaty of Waitangirfe Tiriti o Waitangi shall be considered as always speaking and shall be applied 
to circumstances as they arise so that effect may be given to its spirit and intent. 
(3) The Treaty of Waitangi/Te Tiriti o Waitangi means the Treaty as set out in Maori and English in the 
Schedule to the Act. 
would not replace the original Treaty. The original Treaty would continue to exist and 
represent the agreement between the Crown and the Maori who signed it. 
By enacting the text of the Treaty it would be internalising the Treaty within New 
Zealand's constitutional framework. It is submitted this would also enhance the 
possibility of a sustainable pluralism operating within New Zealand's current 
constitutional framework. 
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However, the fact that the Treaty would continue to exist does not mean that the Treaty 
should not be entrenched. It should be entrenched so that any amendment would require 
wider support than a bare majority of Parliament. One option is to entrench the Treaty so 
that it can only be repealed or amended by a majority of seventy-five percent of all the 
members of the House of Representatives, or through a majority of votes cast at a 
referendum. 120 
The question of whether Parliament can bind itself is one that has been addressed 
previously. Historically there have been two opposing views of Parliamentary supremacy 
and whether Parliament can bind itself. The 'continuing' view sees the power of 
Parliament as legally limitless: a feature of omnipotence is its unalterable or 'continuing' 
quality. The 'self-embracing' view sees the notional omnipotence of Parliament as 
momentary. This means that one of the features of omnipotence is that the all-powerful 
body is able to shed one or more of the attributes which were part of its original state.
121 
The 'self-embracing' has been used in New Zealand in relation to New Zealand's 
electoral legislation. 122 Treaty rights could be entrenched in this manner because it does 
not seek to bind future Parliaments as to the content of future legislation. It would only 
120 See generally "A Bill of Rights for New Zealand - A White Paper", above n 110, 118, which provides a 
useful suggestion for a form of entrenchment. The provision would look as follows : 
"No provision of this Bill of Rights shall be repealed or amended or in any way affected unless the proposal 
(a) is passed by a majority of 75 percent of all the members of the House of Representatives and 
contains an express declaration that it repeals, amends, or affects this Bill of Rights; or 
(b) has been carried by a majority of the valid votes cast at a poll of the electors for the House of 
Representatives; 
and, in either case, the Act making the change recites that the required majority has been obtained." 
121 Paul McHugh, above n 8, 55. 
122 See generally the Electoral Act 1993 and Palmer and Palmer, above n 2, 22. 
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necessitate following a specified procedure if a Parliament did want to change the form of 
Constitution.
123 
It is acknowledged that the process for adopting a provision of this nature would also be 
important. For example, would it require the support of the majority of people at a 
referendum? However, the process for entrenching the Constitution is beyond the scope 
of this paper. 
VIII CONCLUSION 
At some stage New Zealand is going to have to address the issue of the Treaty's place in 
New Zealand's constitution. As it currently stands it is unclear and for now that may suit 
all, or some, of the parties involved. However, over time this approach would seem to 
create animosity between the parties. In addition to this, the fact the role of the Treaty has 
not been settled inhibits the ability of New Zealand to undertake any major constitutional 
development. 124 Constitutional stagnation cannot be maintained for ever. 
To return to the two points I highlighted in the introduction to my paper I would reiterate 
that adopting the Treaty within a Constitution as part of a new hybrid model would 
ensure better protection for Ma01i Treaty rights and formalise the framework for 
assessing those rights. I would envisage that many of the systemic advantages that I have 
outlined would also be of benefit to other minority rights. I have also set out various 
collateral advantages that might be achieved through the new hybrid model. 
It is hoped that clarifying the position of the Treaty can help bring a far greater sense of 
order to the New Zealand system of government and consequently allow greatly 
123 See generally "A Bill of Rights for New Zealand - A White Paper", above n 110, 55 for a disc
ussion of 
the way Parliament can lay down a procedure for a specific purpose. 
124 See generally B.V Harris, above n 30, 290-291 where he notes "A decision to formalise Maori
 interests 
in constitutional law, or to leave the matter to ongoing dialogue, is a political prerequisite to ad
dressing the 
issues in respect of: the future of the monarchy and whether New Zealand becomes a republic;
 the future 
structure and functioning of the legislature and executive; and whether New Zealand adopts fo
rmal written 
constitution. 
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improved community access to, understanding of, and confidence in, the constitution.
125 
It is acknowledged that adopting the Treaty in a Constitution as part of a new hybrid 
model is going to require New Zealand to address difficult issues. Dealing with these 
difficult issues could be the very reason why a process of this type is necessary. I hope 
that New Zealand attempts to deal with these issues sooner rather than later. 
125 B.V Harris, above n 30, 308. 
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